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383 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2004)
L Facts
In the spring of 1996, Jay Lentz and his ex-wife Doris Lentz were engaged
in bitter property and custody disputes arising from the 1995 dissolution of their
six-year marriage.' Doris had expressed fear of Lentz's violent behavior and,
since their divorce, had usually arranged to meet him only in public settings.2 In
April 1996 Lentz and Doris arranged for their daughter Julia to go to Indiana to
visit Lentz's parents.3 On April 23 Doris traveled from her home in Virginia to
Lentz's home in Maryland to retrieve Julia after her trip.' The next morning,
Lentz appeared in family court for a scheduled hearing but Doris did not.5 On
April 28 police found Doris's car, with its doors unlocked and Doris's purse and
keys in plain sight, in a parking lot in Washington, D.C.6 Police found blood
from both Doris and Lentz on the passenger seat of the car.7 At the end of
1996, Lentz moved to Indiana with Julia.'
On April 24, 2001, a federal grand jury indicted Lentz on one charge of
"kidnapping resulting in death." 9 A jury found Lentz guilty in July 2003 and
recommended a life sentence."0 Arguing that the Government had not proven
the kidnapping element of holding for ransom, reward, or otherwise, Lentz filed
1. United States v. Lentz, 383 F.3d 191, 195-96 (4th Cir. 2004).
2. Id at 195.
3. Id at 196.
4. Id. The evidence revealed some confusion as to when Julia was to return from Indiana.
Id Although evidence demonstrated that Doris initially believed she would get Julia back on April
24, Lenrz changed the pick-up date to the night before. Id. Julia's airline ticket, however, had a
return date of April 26, which Lentz changed to April 27. Id
5. Id. at 197.
6. Id
7. Leni, 383 F.3d at 197-98.
8. Id at 198.
9. Id; see 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1) (2000) (providing for life imprisonment or a death sentence
as punishment for "[w]hoever unlawfully seizes,... inveigles,... [or] kidnaps,... any person...
when the person is willfully transported in interstate .. .commerce, regardless of whether the
person was alive when transported across a State boundary if the person was alive when the
transportation began," if death results). None of the individual jurisdictions could put together
enough evidence to prove state murder charges because Doris's body was never found. Lent"- 383
F.3d at 198.
10. Lentz!, 383 F.3d at 198-99.
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a motion for acquittal, which the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia ultimately granted in a post-trial ruling."
The district court also granted Lentz a new trial under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 33 because the jury had access to evidence that was not
admitted during trial. 12 After the trial, three jurors told Lentz's counsel that
Doris's brown day planner and her black pocket calendar were in the jury room
during deliberations. 3 The court had admitted into evidence neither item, with
the exception of two pages from each.' 4 Both the planner and the calendar
"contained Doris's notes concerning Lentz's harassing and threatening behavior
... ; notes concerning Doris's efforts to obtain a protective order; names and
telephone numbers of police officers and a domestic violence support group; and
notes summarizing derogatory statements about Doris made by Lentz to Julia."' 5
After an evidentiary hearing marked by sharply conflicting evidence about how
the planners came to be in the jury room, the district court concluded that
Assistant United States Attorney ("AUSA") Melfin had intentionally provided the




Finding that the Government had presented enough evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of a federal kidnapping resulting
in death, including that Lentz had "held" Doris before killing her, a divided panel
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court's judgment of acquittal.'" The Fourth Circuit also unanimously reversed
the district court's finding of intentional misconduct by AUSA Mellin.' 9 Finally,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's Rule 33 grant of a new trial "based




11. Id. at 199-201.
12. Id. at 205, 219; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a) (stating that "[ulpon the defendant's motion,
the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires"). The
district court granted the new trial in case the court of appeals overturned its postverdict judgment
of acquittal. Lent-, 383 F.3d at 206.
13. Lentz, 383 F.3d at 205.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 206.
17. Id. at 199, 205.
18. Id. at 195,204-05.
19. Lentz, 383 F.3d at 195.
20. Id
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I1. Analysis
A. Kidnapping Resulting in Death
The Fourth Circuit outlined the elements the Government needed to prove
to convict Lentz of the federal capital crime of kidnapping resulting in death.2'
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1), to prove a federal kidnapping, the Government
must show the following: (1) "Doris was 'willfully transported in interstate...
commerce' "; (2) Lentz " 'unlawfully seize[d], confine[d], inveigle[d], decoy[ed],
kidnap[ped], abduct[ed], or carrie[d] [Doris] away' "; (3) Lentz held Doris "'for
ransom or reward or otherwise' "; and (4) Doris's death resulted.2- The district
court found that the Government had not met its burden in proving the third
element of the crime.
2 3
The Fourth Circuit pointed out that Lentz did not contest that the Govern-
ment had proven the first and second elements of the crime.24 The court relied
on its decision in United States v. Wills25 that a kidnapper need not" 'accompany,
physically transport, or provide for the physical transportation of the victim'"
across state lines, but it must simply "show that the kidnapper 'willfully caused
unaccompanied travel over state lines.' ,,26 Finding that the Government pro-
vided enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Lentz had lured
Doris from Virginia to Maryland with the promise of returning their daughter,
the court concluded that the Government had satisfied the first element.27 The
Fourth Circuit also concluded that this evidence of inveigling also satisfied the
second element.28 The court stated that Lentz conceded the fourth element,
death. 9
Lentz's argument for acquittal rested on the claim that the Government did
not prove that he had held Doris" 'for ransom or reward or otherwise.' "30 The
United States Supreme Court defined a "holding" in Chatwin P. United State? as
"'an unlawful physical or mental restraint for an appreciable period against the
21. Id. at 199-200.
22. Id. at 199 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2000)).
23. Id. at 204.
24. Id. at 201.
25. 234 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2000).
26. Lent! 383 F.3d at 199 (quoting United States v. Wills, 234 F.3d 174, 178-79 (4th Cir.
2000)).
27. Id at 200.
28. Id at 2 0 0 -01; see United States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234,239 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that
"[by] inducing his victim by misrepresentations to enter his vehicle ... and knowing that the
victim's belief as to their purpose and destination is different from his actual illicit purpose, the
kidnapper has interfered with, and exercised control over, her actions").
29. Lentz, 383 F.3d at 201.
30. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2000)).
31. 326 U.S. 455 (1946).
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person's will and with a willful intent so to confine the victim.' ,32 Relying on
this standard, Lentz argued that the Government had no direct evidence to show
that, between the time of Doris's arrival and her death, Lentz had "exerted any
physical or mental force sufficient to effect a restraint upon her movements."33
Without such evidence, Lentz claimed, no reasonable jury could find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Lentz had "held" Doris so as to satisfy the third element
of a federal kidnapping.'
The Fourth Circuit concluded, to the contrary, "that the evidence, though
circumstantial, was sufficient to support the jury's determination that, upon
Doris's arrival at Lentz's home, Lentz exerted an unlawful physical or mental
restraint for an appreciable period against Doris's will."3 The court pointed to
evidence that before Doris came to his house on the evening of April 23, Lentz
had stopped his mail, asked his realtor to remove the lockbox from his door, and
spread a blue tarp in the living room.36 Lentz had done no interior painting to
necessitate the tarp but he had repainted a portion of the floor of the carport,
and he later replaced some furniture.37 In addition, the court noted that there
was blood in Doris's normally clean car, and Doris's friends testified that she
would not have allowed Lentz to get into her car.3" The court concluded that
taking this circumstantial evidence as a whole, a jury could reasonably infer that
Lentz used the threat of force to lure Doris into his home, where he killed her.
39
The court found that such a conclusion satisfied the "holding" element of
kidnapping. ° The court further found that, despite the lack of direct evidence
about the time of the murder, the jury reasonably concluded that Lentz did not
kill Doris immediately but indeed held her " 'for an appreciable period.' "4'
Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment of acquit-
tal.
42




35. Id at 201-02.
36. Id. at 202.
37. Id. at 198.
38. Lent%, 383 F.3d at 202.
39. Id. at 202-03.
40. Id.
41. Id at 203 (quoting Chatwin, 326 U.S. at 460).
42. Id at 205.
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B. New Trial
1. Standards of Review
The Fourth Circuit made clear its different standards of review for the
claims in this appeal. The court used a clearly erroneous standard to review "the
district court's factual findings that AUSA Mellin intentionally placed the day
planners with the evidence for the jury."43 The court then applied abuse of
discretion review to the lower court's grant of a new trial based upon the jury's
consideration of extraneous material.44
2. Intentional Misconduct
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the evidence adduced during the hearing
to determine how the inadmissible evidence got into the jury room was too
equivocal to sustain the district court's conclusions and that "the district court's
finding of intentional misconduct rest[ed] upon several clearly erroneous underly-
ing factual findings."4  The court found that the district court erroneously
construed the record to find that it had repeatedly excluded the planners in
response to the Government's persistent efforts to introduce them as evidence.4
By relying on this finding, and by erroneously concluding that the court's own
staff was not responsible for the planners' presence in the jury room, the district
court erred in finding that AUSA Mellin had intentionally concocted a plan to
sneak the inadmissible evidence to the jury.47 Attributing the planners' journey
to the jury to "inadvertent errors," the Fourth Circuit therefore reversed the
district court's holding of intentional misconduct by AUSA Mellin. 48
3. New Trial in the Interest ofJustice
Despite its finding that no intentional misconduct had occurred, the Fourth
Circuit nonetheless reviewed the district court's grant of a new trial according to
the standards of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a), which states that "the
district court 'may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of
justice so requires.' ,4' The court stated that, under its ruling in United States v.
Barnes,5° " '[i] f prejudicial evidence that was not introduced at trial comes before
43. Id. at 210.
44. Lent7 ,383 F.3d at 219.
45. Id at 210.
46. Id. at 211-12.
47. Id. at 211-17.
48. Id. at 218 n.12, 219.
49. Id. at 219 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 33(a)).
50. 747 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1984).
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the jury, the defendant is entitled to a new trial.' ,s' The court defined prejudice
as" 'a reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict was influenced by the material
that improperly came before it.', 2 The court placed the burden on the Govern-
ment to prove that the exposure to the evidence was harmless.53
Applying this standard, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court
had not abused its discretion in finding the extraneous material prejudicial and
in granting Lentz a new trial.' The court found that the likelihood of prejudice
was strong in each of the four categories of extraneous materials that had reached
the jury.5  The Fourth Circuit thus affirmed the district court's grant of a new
trial and remanded the case for a trial before a new judge.
5 6
IV. Application to Virginia Practice
The Fourth Circuit majority's willingness to defer to a jury's inference of
guilt based on layers of circumstantial evidence contrasts with its refusal to defer
to the district court's factual findings that were likewise based upon similarly
circumstantial evidence. Even the Government acknowledged in its argument
before the district court that it could not explain precisely how or for how long
Lentz held Doris prior to killing her. 7 The dissent detailed this colloquy between
the Government and the district court:
THE COURT: Tell me what the detention is in this case.
[AN AUSAI: The detention began, Your Honor, when [Doris] was
inveigled. She was being held when she started to be inveigled over to
[Lentz's] house. And when she got to his house, he had to hold her
to kill her. Somehow or other, he detained her there and he killed her.
THE COURT: What evidence do you have of any of that?
[AN AUSA]: That [Doris] was ultimately killed. And that [Lentz] had
to hold her to detain her to ultimately kill her.5"
As the above exchange illustrates, the Government itself had to make leaps of
logic to assert that there had been a "holding" in this case. The Fourth Circuit
51. Lent, 383 F.3d at 219 (quoting United States v. Barnes, 747 F.2d 246, 250 (4th Cir.
1984)).
52. Id (quoting Barnes, 747 F.2d at 250).
53. Id
54. Id. at 221.
55. Id at 220-21. The district court classified the inadmissible information as follows: (1)
notes concerning threats Lentz had made to Doris; (2) notes concerning Doris's pursuit of a
protective order; (3) "notes documenting statements made by Lentz to Julia"; and (4) notes
concerning Doris's inquiry into domestic violence advice. Id at 220.
56. Id at 221-22.
57. Lent!," 383 F.3d at 223.
58. Id
[Vol. 17:1
UNITED STATES V. LENTZ
nevertheless concluded that a rational jury could have come to the same conclu-
sion based upon this completely circumstantial evidence.
5 9
The Fourth Circuit, however, refused to grant the district court the same
leeway it granted the Government in the misplaced planner situation. The
district court heard evidence from defense counsel, the Government, and its own
staff concerning the process of preparing the evidence to go to the jury.' None
of the witnesses could explain how the planners got to the jury, but it was at least
clear that they ended up in the jury room.6 ' The district court may have gone too
far in assigning blame to AUSA Mellin, but it surely went no further than did the
jury in concluding, based upon no direct evidence, that Lentz had held Doris for
a time period sufficient to satisfy the third element of federal kidnapping.
V. Conclusion
In Lent,- the Fourth Circuit appears to have granted AUSA Mellin a more
robust presumption of innocence than it gave Lentz, even though the "clearly
erroneous" standard of review normally imposes a heavier burden on the party
challenging the factual findings of a trial judge. Lentz received his new trial
because the jury mysteriously received evidence that the district court had
originally refused to allow it to consider. The Government, however, also
received a second chance to prove what the district court said that it had not
proven in the first trial.
Tamara L. Graham
59. Id at 203-04.
60. Id at 205-19.
61. Id.
20041

